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By the Pricking of My Thumbs, State Restriction This 
Way Comes: Immunizing Vaccination Laws from 
Constitutional Review 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 2014, Disneyland in California was far from the happiest 
place on earth: an outbreak of measles began,1 lasting until April 17, 2015, 
and infecting at least 147 people.2 The outbreak was blamed on an 
insufficient number of vaccinated children, and it also infected many 
children, some of whom were infants too young to be fully vaccinated 
against the measles.3 From January 1, 2015 to September 18, 2015,4 the 
total number of reported measles cases in the United States was 189, 
covering 24 states and the District of Columbia.5 
Outbreaks6 such as the Disneyland incident represent an alarming 
trend in recent years. In 2014, the United States had a record number of 
measles outbreaks, with 27 states reporting a total of 668 cases.7 This 
number shattered the record since the declaration of the elimination of 
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measles in 2000.8 In 2013, the U.S. experienced 11 outbreaks of measles, 
with one large outbreak affecting unvaccinated Amish communities in 
Ohio. 9 The total number of cases in 2013 was at least 175.10 In 2011, 17 
outbreaks and 22 measles cases were reported, at the time marking the 
highest number of measles cases in a given year since 1996.11 The Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) reports that most victims are 
unvaccinated and that the disease spreads through unvaccinated groups.12 
Thus, high vaccination rates are vital to prevent the spread of diseases.13 
To ensure high vaccination rates, all 50 states have mandatory 
vaccination laws requiring their citizens to be vaccinated.14 Three types of 
exemptions from mandatory state vaccination laws exist: medical, 
philosophical, and religious exemptions.15 Although medical exemptions 
are not controversial, philosophical and religious exemptions are, not only 
because of the possible threat the exemptions could create by lowering 
vaccination rates,16 but also because unlike medical exemptions, they are 
based on parental beliefs rather than the child’s medical condition. The 
Supreme Court has never heard a case involving exemptions to state 
vaccination laws and has heard only two cases involving vaccination laws 
in general: Jacobson v. Massachusetts17 and Zucht v. King.18 Together 
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these cases held that states have the police power to mandate vaccinations 
and make them a prerequisite for attending school.19 Since Zucht in 1922,20 
however, the Supreme Court has developed a line of jurisprudence that 
recognizes parental rights as constitutionally protected.21 These parental 
rights holdings conflict with the previous holdings of the Court’s 
vaccination cases in Jacobson and Zucht because state laws forcing 
parents to vaccinate their children over parental objections could violate 
the parents’ constitutional rights. 
This Comment argues that states should not allow philosophical 
exemptions and should either retain or create religious exemptions that 
meet certain requirements under the Free Exercise Clause, the Due Process 
Clause, and the Establishment Clause. California and Louisiana differ in 
their approaches to vaccination laws. As a result of the California 
legislature’s controversial response to the Disneyland measles outbreak by 
banning philosophical and religious exemptions,22 California is now 
among the few states with the strictest vaccination requirements.23 In 
contrast, Louisiana is among the states with the laxest vaccination laws, 
which allow for both exemptions.24 Under the proposed solution, 
California should modify its law to allow religious exemptions, and 
Louisiana should ban philosophical exemptions. 
Part I of this Comment details the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
regarding parental rights. It explains how the protection that these cases 
afford to parental rights under the Due Process Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause could provide a framework different from Jacobson and Zucht 
through which to view state vaccination laws. It also gives a brief history of 
the invention of vaccinations and explains the necessity of maintaining high 
vaccination rates, in addition to discussing the three types of exemptions. 
Part II analyzes the scarce Supreme Court jurisprudence on state vaccination 
laws. It also explains the controversy surrounding California Senate Bill 
277, which California’s legislature enacted in response to the Disneyland 
measles outbreak, and compares California law to Louisiana law. Part III 
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details the different approaches lower courts have taken when analyzing 
exemptions, with an eye toward the solution of banning philosophical 
exemptions while allowing religious exemptions. Part IV proposes the 
solution of banning philosophical exemptions and allowing religious 
exemptions as a policy matter and suggests a change in the wording of 
state vaccination legislation to meet Free Exercise, Due Process, and 
Establishment Clause requirements. 
I. ALL OUR YESTERDAYS: PARENTAL RIGHTS V. VACCINATION LAWS 
The state has an interest in vaccinating its citizens to safeguard them 
from diseases; these disease control efforts, however, might conflict with 
the freedom of parents to raise their children as they wish. Whether the 
issue is considered a parental rights or a states’ rights issue controls the 
answer to the questions surrounding exemptions to state vaccination laws. 
The Supreme Court has heard cases regarding parental authority that are 
wholly separate from cases involving vaccination laws. The cases the 
Court has heard regarding vaccinations held that the state has the power to 
mandate vaccination laws.25 Parental rights cases, however, have generally 
held that parental authority is protected under the Due Process Clause and 
sometimes the Free Exercise Clause from the states’ attempts to interfere 
with parental decisions regarding how children are raised.26 An analysis of 
exemptions to state vaccination laws under parental rights case law 
changes the discussion from one of states’ rights to enact laws to protect 
the public from disease to one of parents’ rights to raise their children as 
they deem fit.27 
A. Constitutional Protection of Parental Rights 
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
importance of parental rights. The protections afforded to parental rights 
fall into two categories: Due Process protections and Free Exercise 
protections.28 The Court has upheld parental rights in these cases, even 
over the state’s interest in educating its citizens and claims of visitation 
                                                                                                             
 25. Zucht, 260 U.S. at 176; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 36–37 
(1905). 
 26. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–
35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
 27. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–
35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
 28. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–
35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 




rights. Moreover, when parental decisions are based on religion, the Court 
takes particular note of the rights parents possess to raise their children in 
the religion they wish, even if the decision conflicts with a state law.29 
1. Due Process Protections 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that 
citizens will not be denied fundamental rights without due process of 
law.30 Although the Due Process Clause does not explicitly acknowledge 
parental rights, the Supreme Court has recognized that parental rights are 
protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court struck down a law that limited 
parents’ rights to educate their children in speaking a foreign language 
under the Due Process Clause.32 Despite the absence of parental rights in 
the Constitution, the Court recognized the right “to marry, establish a 
home and bring up children” as protected under the Due Process Clause.33 
Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held that a law 
requiring children to attend public schools violated the Due Process Clause 
because it interfered with parents’ rights to raise their children as they 
wished.34 The Court reasoned, “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the 
State,”35 thereby recognizing that states generally cannot interfere with 
parents’ decisions to raise their children as they wish. 
In the more recent case of Troxel v. Granville, the Court overturned a 
law that allowed the courts to override parental decisions as to what their 
children’s best interests were with regard to the visitation rights of 
nonparents—in this case, grandparents.36 In its holding, the Court 
recognized its extensive jurisprudence upholding parental rights, stating, 
“[i]n light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the 
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental 
right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control 
of their children.”37 Thus, under Troxel, parents possess the exclusive right 
not only to raise their children as they wish, but also to make decisions for 
their children’s well-being. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court has firmly established parental rights 
as protected by the Due Process Clause. Furthermore, these holdings show 
that the Supreme Court will uphold parental rights even under claims that 
the parent’s decision is not in the child’s best interest. 
2. Free Exercise Clause Protections 
In addition to recognizing parental rights under the Due Process 
Clause, the Court has also defended parental rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause, which prohibits the government from barring the free exercise of 
religion.38 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, two Amish families challenged a law 
mandating school attendance until the age of 16 on the grounds that it 
violated the principles of the Amish religion.39 The families argued that 
school attendance at this time in the children’s lives significantly 
interfered with Amish religious training because the two occurred at the 
same time.40 The Court declared the application of the law to the Amish 
families unconstitutional and explained that giving the state this much 
power under parens patriae41 would be tantamount to deciding the child’s 
“religious future.”42 The Court rejected the claim that the state should 
rescue Amish children from their parents’ religious beliefs, stating that the 
case implicated the “fundamental interest of parents . . . to guide the 
religious future and education of their children,” and that parents’ rights 
to raise their children as they wish were “now established beyond 
debate.”43 Thus, under Yoder, parents possess the fundamental right to 
educate and raise their children in the religion of the parents’ choosing. 
The Court also indirectly addressed parental rights in a case that on its 
face seemed to have no relation to the issue. In Employment Division of 
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Oregon v. Smith, the defendants had ingested peyote, which Oregon’s 
criminal law considered a “controlled substance,” as part of a Native 
American religious sacrament.44 The Court rejected the defendants’ 
argument that their religious beliefs should decriminalize their conduct 
under the relevant statute, stating, “[w]e have never held that an 
individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an 
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”45 
The primary effect of Smith is that laws burdening religion are permissible 
and not subject to the compelling interest test46 as long as they are 
generally applicable and not targeted at that religion.47 
Although the case did not involve parental rights, in dicta, the Court 
turned to the protection of parental rights under the Free Exercise Clause.48 
It noted that the compelling interest test still applied to laws restricting the 
free exercise of religion when the religious activity was connected to other 
constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to raise 
children under Pierce and Yoder.49 Thus, the Court explicitly recognized 
that parental rights connected with freedom of religion receive extensive 
protection under the Constitution.  
The Court refused to mandate that states create sweeping religious 
exemptions to their laws as a whole and included vaccination laws in its 
listing of generally applicable state laws.50 It observed, however, that the 
states themselves are free to create nondiscriminatory religious 
exemptions to their laws.51 It also noted that religious exemptions can be 
“desirable,” although these exemptions are not constitutionally required, 
nor immune from judicial review.52 Although exemptions to state 
vaccination laws might not be constitutionally mandated, the Court 
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recognized the importance of religious exemptions with regard to all state 
laws, and specifically vaccination laws. 
B. Vaccination History, Laws, and Exemptions 
Vaccinations play an important role in maintaining public health, but 
state-mandated vaccinations have the potential to conflict with parents’ 
religious beliefs and concerns over safety and health. Three types of 
exemptions exist that allow parents to opt out of vaccinating their children 
in accordance with these beliefs and concerns. Because vaccinations are 
vital to maintaining disease eradication, the state has a high interest in 
ensuring that its citizens are vaccinated. 
1. History of Vaccinations and Herd Immunity 
The state’s interest in maintaining high vaccination rates to keep 
citizens healthy traces back to 1796, when Edward Jenner invented the 
smallpox vaccine.53 Vaccines were a medical breakthrough, and their use 
quickly spread throughout Europe and the United States.54 In 1809, 
Massachusetts became the first state to mandate vaccinations, and in 1855, 
became the first state to mandate childhood vaccinations as a prerequisite 
for attending school.55 The CDC now counts vaccinations as one of the top 
ten public health achievements of the 20th century.56 
One of the primary medical reasons responsible for this achievement is 
that vaccinations rely on what is known as “herd immunity” to sustain 
disease eradication.57 Herd immunity is the phenomenon that occurs once a 
high percentage of the population is vaccinated.58 Vaccinated persons serve 
as a “barrier” to the few who are not vaccinated and prevent the spread of 
diseases that are transmitted individually.59 Although 100% of the 
population is not required to be vaccinated, once a high enough percentage 
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is vaccinated, herd immunity confers the benefits of disease protection to 
the entire population.60 
Because those who are unvaccinated profit from vaccinations while 
avoiding the perceived risks of vaccinations, the practice of being 
unvaccinated is incentivized.61 This attitude threatens the existence of herd 
immunity; once the percentage of vaccinated persons drops sufficiently, 
herd immunity is destroyed.62 The potential for outbreaks increases with 
high concentrations of unvaccinated persons.63 Unvaccinated persons can 
endanger infants too young to be vaccinated, the elderly, and those with 
compromised immune systems, such as cancer patients, by exposing them 
to diseases preventable by vaccines.64  
One study confirmed that geographically concentrated groups with 
high rates of unvaccinated children pose a risk of transmitting diseases to 
the vaccinated population, specifically, to those for whom vaccinations 
were not effective for some reason.65 Additionally, unvaccinated children 
have a risk of contracting measles 35 times higher than do vaccinated 
children.66 Despite this data, California has reported a particularly high 
rate of “exemptors”—that is, parents who opt out of vaccinating their 
children—who were generally clustered in the same geographic regions, 
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with 16% of schools reporting higher than average percentages of 
unvaccinated kindergarteners.67  
Exemptors do not pose a serious threat to the rest of the vaccinated 
population, but only if exemption rates remain low and vaccination rates 
remain high.68 Thus, the policy interest of the state in maintaining a healthy 
community through herd immunity could be jeopardized if too many parents 
claim exemptions to vaccination laws. All 50 states have mandatory 
vaccination laws for children as a requirement for school attendance,69 but 
exemptions to these vaccination laws have been blamed for lowering rates 
of vaccinations.70 
2. Objections to Vaccines: Three Types of Exemptions 
Three types of exemptions from vaccination requirements are recognized: 
medical, philosophical—also called personal—and religious exemptions.71 
States vary with regard to the level of proof required to grant exemptions, and 
one study found that the laxer a state is in requiring proof of reasons for 
objections, whether religious or philosophical, the higher the number of 
unvaccinated children in that state.72 States that required a form signed by a 
parent or guardian, a letter from a parent, or a notarized signature—in that 
order of complexity—had lower rates of exemptions, whereas states with 
lower standards of proof had higher rates of exemptions.73 In other words, 
the higher the rate of complexity in the process of applying for exemptions, 
the lower the rate of actual exemptions, and the lower the rate of 
complexity, the higher the rate of exemptions. California, Mississippi, and 
West Virginia have the strictest vaccination laws in the U.S. because they 
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recognize neither philosophical nor religious exemptions.74 In contrast, 
Louisiana is among the states with the laxest requirements because it 
grants medical, philosophical, and religious exemptions.75 
a. Medical Exemptions 
Medical exemptions are consistent with the state’s policy interest of 
keeping its citizens healthy. All 50 states recognize medical exemptions,76 
and they are not controversial. Children who suffer from cancer, whose 
immune systems have been compromised, or who are allergic to vaccines 
receive these exemptions upon certification from their doctors.77 Forcing 
children who would be harmed by vaccinations to receive them would 
violate the state’s policy interest of ensuring that its citizens are healthy, 
and thus these exemptions are fully justified. 
b. Philosophical Exemptions 
In contrast to medical exemptions, which require a preexisting medical 
condition for the child to qualify, philosophical exemptions78 are often based 
on “‘personal,’ ‘moral,’ or ‘other’ beliefs,” or, more simply, the parents’ 
beliefs.79 These laws typically require that the beliefs be sincerely held or 
exercised in good faith,80 although states rarely, if ever, enforce these 
requirements.81 
A prime example of a philosophical objection to vaccinations is the 
widely held belief that vaccinations cause autism. In 1998, Dr. Andrew 
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Wakefield and 11 other doctors published a medical study claiming a link 
between autism and the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine, also known 
as the MMR vaccine.82 In response, alarmed parents refused to vaccinate 
their children for fear of triggering autism.83 Consequently, vaccination 
rates in the U.S. have decreased significantly.84 Despite the retraction of 
the article85 and the denial from the scientific community of any link 
between autism and vaccinations,86 parents continue to object to 
vaccinating their children on this ground.87  
c. Religious Exemptions 
Similar to the requirements for philosophical exemptions, religious 
exemptions88 require that parents hold certain beliefs. In contrast to 
philosophical exemptions, however, the reason for objecting must be 
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based on religious rather than secular grounds.89 The majority view90 is 
that parents who possess a “sincerely held religious belief” against 
vaccinations must be granted religious exemptions under vaccination laws 
that allow them.91 Religious groups who receive these exemptions, such 
as the Amish, Christian Scientists, and Mennonites, have experienced 
major outbreaks of diseases that those vaccines were designed to target.92 
Religious groups that opt out of vaccinations pose a lesser threat to the rest 
of the population, however, because they are few in number and 
geographically concentrated.93 
II. ITS HOUR UPON THE STAGE: VACCINATION CASES 
AND CONTROVERSIES 
Despite the important issues that vaccination laws and exemptions raise, 
the Supreme Court has heard only two vaccination cases that implicate 
mandatory state vaccination laws, Jacobson v. Massachusetts and Zucht v. 
King.94 The more recent case, Zucht, is from 1922.95 Additionally, the cases 
do not address either philosophical or religious exemptions. Thus, this dated 
precedent fails to include any consideration of exemptions or of the 
constitutional rights that the Court has since afforded to parents. Although 
the Court’s previous precedent affirmed states’ police power to mandate 
vaccination laws,96 the Court could decide differently today. 
A. Supreme Court Vaccination Cases 
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court confirmed that states 
possess the police power to set their own laws governing vaccinations of 
their citizens.97 Jacobson had objected to being vaccinated against smallpox 
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because he claimed that the vaccine presented a risk of death, that as a child 
he had experienced an adverse reaction to a vaccine, and that he had observed 
a similar reaction in his own son.98 He argued that the state law mandating 
vaccinations was “unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive” and that forced 
vaccinations were tantamount to personal assaults.99 In rejecting his claims 
and upholding Massachusetts’s mandatory vaccination law, the Court stated 
that it was “unwilling” to hold that “one person, or a minority of persons, 
residing in any community and enjoying the benefits of its local government, 
should have the power thus to dominate the majority when supported in their 
action by the authority of the State.”100 Therefore, the Court has recognized 
that in the context of vaccinations, the state has the police power to override a 
minority viewpoint. 
The Supreme Court expanded this reasoning 17 years later in Zucht v. 
King.101 In San Antonio, Texas, a couple refused to vaccinate their child in 
accordance with state ordinances on the grounds that the compulsory 
vaccination requirement deprived the child of her liberty without due process 
of law.102 The Court held that mandating vaccinations for all children as a 
condition of attending school was constitutional and fell within the state’s 
police power.103 Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed states’ rights to impose 
their own requirements regarding vaccinations. 
B. State Laws 
Since the Supreme Court has held that states have the power to impose 
requirements regarding vaccinations,104 the states have taken seriously the 
right to create their own exemptions. The states possess a wide array of 
vaccination laws: some allow medical, philosophical, and religious 
exemptions; some allow only medical exemptions; and others recognize 
only medical and religious exemptions.105 As a result of recent legislation, 
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California is now among only three states that have the strictest 
vaccination laws in the nation.106 
1. History and Content of California SB277 
In response to the measles outbreak at Disneyland in 2014, the California 
legislature passed Senate Bill 277, which does not allow parents to opt out of 
vaccinating their children for philosophical or religious reasons unless they 
choose to homeschool.107 The bill radically alters California’s existing law 
because the state previously allowed both philosophical and religious 
exemptions.108 Governor Jerry Brown signed the bill, CA SB277, into law on 
June 30, 2015,109 and the law took effect on July 1, 2016.110 Opposition arose 
quickly, with groups suing to stop the law’s enforcement almost immediately 
after the law took effect.111 A central objection to state-mandated vaccinations 
is that the government is exercising extensive control over parents’ rights to 
choose what they believe is best for their children.112 
2. Louisiana Vaccination Laws 
Were they to move to Louisiana, California parents would face none 
of these concerns for three reasons. First, Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 17:170(E) allows medical, religious, and personal exemptions 
from vaccinations.113 Second, Louisiana Children’s Code article 101 
specifically provides that parents can make their own choices regarding 
their children’s medical health.114 This provision has apparently not been 
controversial enough to generate a discussion of the scope of the article: 
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no Louisiana cases applying the provision exist as of the writing of this 
Comment. Third, Louisiana has enacted the Preservation of Religious 
Freedom Act.115 It declares religion a “fundamental right of the highest order 
in this state.”116 California does not possess an equivalent of Louisiana’s 
religious freedom act.117 Louisiana’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act 
might mean that Louisiana could not eliminate its religious exemption to its 
vaccination laws without violating the Act. On the other hand, because 
California does not have a state religious freedom act, it might not suffer any 
adverse legal consequences by eliminating its religious exemption. 
III. SOUND AND FURY: PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS 
OBJECTIONS TO VACCINATION LAWS 
The two main controversies surrounding vaccination laws and 
exemptions involve philosophical objections and religious objections.118 
Parents who object to vaccination laws on philosophical grounds alone, 
however, might lose their case. A potentially more successful argument is 
that state-mandated vaccination laws infringe on parental rights regarding 
the raising of children under the more recent Supreme Court precedent 
interpreting the Due Process Clause. Parents might also argue that they 
should be recognized as conscientious objectors—that is, those who are 
opposed to a duty required by law—an argument typically used in the 
context of conscription into the military.119 A constitutional analysis 
reveals that states are not required to have philosophical exemptions under 
either the Due Process Clause or the conscientious objector doctrine of the 
First Amendment. Similarly, jurisprudence shows that religious 
exemptions to state vaccination laws are constitutional.120 As with 
philosophical exemptions, religious exemptions are not required under the 
Due Process Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Because states are not 
forbidden to have philosophical or religious exemptions but instead are 
free to create exemptions as they wish, a policy analysis is needed to 
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resolve the question of whether states should have philosophical and 
religious exemptions. 
A. Philosophical Objections 
Philosophical exemptions can be based on almost any reason the 
parent has for objecting to vaccinations and can therefore vary widely.121 
One philosophical objection to vaccinations is the widespread belief 
among parents that vaccinations cause autism.122 This objection is now 
based on discredited science,123 which could pose a serious roadblock for 
parents who wish to opt out of vaccinating their children for this reason. 
Additionally, under Jacobson and Zucht, the states clearly possess the 
police power to enforce their vaccination requirements.124 Parents would 
need to rely on constitutional arguments to convince states to create or 
retain a philosophical exemption. 
1. Parental Due Process Rights Do Not Require Philosophical 
Exemptions 
Parents opposing vaccinations for philosophical reasons could make a 
compelling argument that under the more recent line of Supreme Court 
parental rights cases, parents must be allowed to refuse vaccinations based 
on philosophical reasons. Certainly, the trifecta of Meyer, Pierce, and 
Troxel all plainly state the Court’s holdings that parents are allowed to 
make their own decisions regarding the raising of their children and that 
the Due Process Clause protects parental rights.125 Parents might also rely 
on the Court’s language that raising a family is “of similar order and 
magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected.”126 The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Parham v. J.R.127 also could be used to 
support this argument. In Parham, the Court upheld a law allowing parents 
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to commit their children to hospitals for treatment of mental illnesses, 
reasoning that parents possess the knowledge necessary to make decisions 
for their young children.128 The Court thereby recognized that parents have 
the right to make decisions for their children’s medical treatment.129 
As one court noted, however, philosophical beliefs are traditionally 
not afforded the same high level of protection that religious beliefs 
receive.130 Religious claims are afforded more protection under the 
Constitution than personal or philosophical claims, even when these 
groups have identical underlying values.131 Furthermore, although more 
recent than Jacobson and Zucht, the decisions of Meyer, Pierce, and 
Troxel support parental rights but do not address vaccinations.132 Jacobson 
and Zucht are more controlling because they specifically address the issue 
of vaccinations and recognize state police power to set vaccination laws.133 
Additionally, the case law could be interpreted as having already 
addressed an argument in favor of constitutionally required philosophical 
exemptions. In Jacobson, the father’s belief that vaccines had adverse 
results134 should be viewed as akin to, if not identical to, current objections 
that vaccines cause autism. In addressing the father’s concern, the Court 
stated that a minority view could not take precedence over the majority 
and endanger public health.135 The Parham Court added that states possess 
control over parental decisions when the child’s health, mental or physical, 
is endangered.136 If states can intervene in the realm of parental authority 
when parents endanger their own children, states should be able to 
intervene by banning philosophical exemptions when parental decisions 
endanger both their own children and other children. In the case of 
vaccinations, when parents opt out of vaccinating their children, thereby 
lowering vaccination rates and undermining herd immunity, they increase 
the risk for all children to contract a preventable disease.137 Nevertheless, 
other arguments exist in favor of philosophical exemptions. 
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2. Parents Opposed to Vaccinations Could Be Conscientious 
Objectors 
Although the parental due process argument seems likely to fail, a 
potential second argument in favor of philosophical exemptions analogizes 
these parents to conscientious objectors. In United States v. Seeger, the 
Supreme Court held that although the pacifist belief in question was not 
based on an “orthodox belief in God,” the belief was “sincere, honest, and 
made in good faith.”138 Therefore, the Court extended the religious 
exemption to mandatory military service to a group of young men who 
objected to serving in the military.139 The Court stated that “any person 
opposed to war on the basis of a sincere belief, which in his life fills the 
same place as a belief in God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist” 
should receive an exemption.140 
Parents who object to vaccinations on the grounds that vaccinations cause 
autism could argue that their beliefs regarding the alleged link between 
vaccines and autism are sincere and made in good faith, and therefore, the 
Seeger definition of religion should apply to them. Although these beliefs 
might be found to be sincere and made in good faith, they do not fill “the 
same place as a belief in God.”141 The Seeger Court based its holding on 
the fact that the beliefs qualified as religious exemptions,142 and objections 
that rely on the correlations between vaccines and autism or other adverse 
side effects are not based on beliefs akin to religion. The objections are 
judgments regarding the effects of vaccinations, but not religious judgments. 
The Court’s statement that beliefs of conscientious objectors cannot allow 
them to avoid a “colliding duty fixed by a democratic government”143 bears 
out that this argument should not succeed. In this situation, the conscientious 
opposition would be objections to vaccinations on philosophical grounds, and 
the colliding duty would be vaccination laws that aim to maintain high 
vaccination rates for the public good. 
B. Religious Exemptions 
Although states are concerned with the public good of maintaining high 
vaccination rates, they must also consider the public good of allowing citizens 
to exercise religion freely. If religious exemptions are constitutionally 
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permissible, the inquiry then turns to whether religious exemptions are 
constitutionally required. 
1. The Constitutionality of Religious Exemptions 
Regardless of whether religious exemptions are constitutionally required, 
the Smith Court noted that religious exemptions are permissible.144 The 
holdings in Jacobson and Zucht also support the conclusion that states are 
permitted to enact religious exemptions to vaccination laws.145 If a state can 
create mandatory vaccination laws under its police power,146 it should also be 
able to create religious exemptions. Religious exemptions should be analyzed 
under the Free Exercise Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Establishment 
Clause to provide a complete analysis of the questions surrounding religious 
exemptions and the state’s police power to enact them. 
a. Religious Exemptions Do Not Violate the Free Exercise Clause 
The police power granted to the states does not extend so far as to allow 
states to create any kind of religious exemptions they wish. Courts have 
repeatedly struck down religious exemptions only for “bona fide members 
of a recognized religion”147 or a “recognized church or denomination”148 
because this language violates the Free Exercise Clause by infringing upon 
the rights of adherents to nontraditional religions.149 One court held that the 
refusal to recognize nontraditional religious beliefs under the state’s 
religious exemption violated the Free Exercise Clause.150 Another court 
granted religious exemptions to Jewish parents based on their personal 
religious beliefs even though Judaism does not contain any objections to 
vaccinations.151 These decisions suggest that if a religious exemption does 
not favor some religions over others and specifically does not burden the 
beliefs of nontraditional religions, the exemption would not violate the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
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Additionally, although some courts have upheld vaccination laws that did 
not allow religious exemptions,152 no court has held a religious exemption 
unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause. One court declined to reach 
the issue of whether the state’s interest might be pressing enough to intrude 
on decisions not to vaccinate.153 Another court declined to reach the First 
Amendment issues and simply relied upon “traditional child custody 
analysis”154 in holding that the mother’s objection was based on religious 
beliefs155—the court did not even question the constitutionality of the 
religious exemption. Based on these decisions, states are permitted to enact 
religious exemptions that do not infringe upon religious minorities’ rights 
under the Free Exercise Clause. 
b. Religious Exemptions Do Not Violate the Due Process Clause 
Similar to the jurisprudence generally in favor of allowing religious 
exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause, courts have readily accepted 
the existence of religious exemptions under the Due Process Clause as 
long as the exemption is not so narrowly tailored to exclude nontraditional 
beliefs.156 Many other courts have heard cases that involve religious 
exemptions, and regardless of whether the courts found that the belief was 
in fact religious, they have either refused to comment on or have not 
addressed the exemption’s constitutionality, thus leaving the exemption 
intact.157 The Smith Court went so far as to refer to religious exemptions 
as “desirable.”158 States are thus permitted to create religious exemptions 
under the Due Process Clause. 
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c. Religious Exemptions Do Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause 
In contrast to the jurisprudence generally in favor of allowing religious 
exemptions under the Free Exercise and Due Process Clauses, one case 
supports striking down religious exemptions to state vaccination laws on 
Equal Protection grounds.159 In Brown v. Stone, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court held that the religious exemption to its vaccination laws was 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.160 The court reasoned that the statute requiring mandatory 
vaccinations for children “serves an overriding and compelling public 
interest.”161 The court reasoned that allowing religious exemptions for 
children with religious parents, who could claim an exemption based upon 
religion, violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of children without 
religious parents.162 
Brown is unique, however, and does not have support—Mississippi is 
the only state to adopt such a radical precedent.163 Without considering the 
rights of parents to raise their children in the religion they wish, the Brown 
court held that the statute mandating vaccinations was “complete in itself” 
without providing religious exemptions and that the protection of 
schoolchildren was a compelling state interest.164 The court failed to weigh 
those competing interests and recognize that the statute’s narrow 
exemption for religious beliefs furthered parents’ rights, particularly 
religious rights, to raise their children in the religion they wish. This 
approach contradicts that of many courts that have not even questioned the 
constitutionality of a religious exemption under the Equal Protection 
Clause.165 Consequently, Brown should not be followed, and courts should 
rely on the Free Exercise and Due Process Clauses precedents. 
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d. Religious Exemptions Do Not Violate the Establishment Clause 
Assuming that courts would rely on the precedents of the Free 
Exercise and Due Process Clauses in allowing religious exemptions, states 
must also consider how to define “religion” in exemptions under the 
Establishment Clause, which provides that Congress cannot make a law 
regarding the “establishment of religion.”166 One fiercely contested issue is 
determining what beliefs are considered religions such that adherents are 
eligible to receive exemptions to vaccinations. One court held that requiring 
the religion to be a nationally recognized and established church did not 
violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.167 The majority 
view,168 however, is that such requirements violate the Establishment Clause 
and that anyone who possesses a “sincerely held religious belief” opposed 
to vaccinations, regardless of whether the religion is conventional, must be 
allowed to opt out under the state’s exemption.169 
In furtherance of this view, one commentator argues that the Lemon v. 
Kurtzman test allows religious exemptions to vaccinations.170 Lemon sets 
forth a three-part test to determine whether a law violates the Establishment 
Clause.171 First, the purpose of the law must be secular.172 Second, the law’s 
main effect must neither promote nor hinder religion.173 Finally, the law 
must not have “an excessive government entanglement with religion.”174 
This commentator argues that religious exemptions are allowed under the 
Establishment Clause if two requirements are met: first, the exemption 
must be neutral toward religions; and second, the relief that religious 
freedom receives from the law must justify the subsequent burdens upon 
those who do not benefit from the law.175  
In addition to the Lemon test, the Supreme Court has articulated other 
Establishment Clause tests. Another comes from Agostini v. Felton, in 
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which the Court stated three criteria for a law to avoid violating the 
Establishment Clause:176 the law must not promote “indoctrination” by the 
government; the law must not specifically name religions; and the law 
must not be overly intertwined with religion.177 Under Cutter v. 
Wilkinson,178 the law must be analyzed under the effects the exemption 
might have on nonreligious citizens, the discrimination among religions, 
and the chance of an exemption trumping other significant concerns.179 
Provided that a religious exemption does not violate these tests, it is 
constitutionally permissible. 
2. Religious Exemptions Are Not Constitutionally Required 
Because states are constitutionally permitted to establish religious 
exemptions to their vaccination laws, the next inquiry is whether states are 
constitutionally required to have religious exemptions. Similar to the 
analysis of whether states are constitutionally permitted to have religious 
exemptions, this inquiry also turns on the Free Exercise and Due Process 
Clauses.  
a. The Free Exercise Clause Does Not Require Religious Exemptions 
Although the Smith Court noted that states may create religious 
exemptions to their laws and that the exemptions might even be 
“desirable,” it added that these exemptions are not constitutionally 
required and suggested the decision should be left to the discretion of state 
legislatures.180 Dicta from another Supreme Court case, Prince v. 
Massachusetts, suggests that religious exemptions might not be required 
under the Free Exercise Clause.181 The Court rejected the argument that a 
parent or guardian was free to violate child labor laws on religious grounds 
under the Free Exercise Clause by enlisting the child to distribute religious 
pamphlets.182 The case did not involve vaccination laws, but in dicta the 
Court specifically highlighted religious objections to vaccinations, stating, 
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“[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose 
the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill 
health or death.”183 The Court did not clarify whether it meant that parents 
cannot claim religious exemptions when state law provides no exemptions, 
or rather that religious exemptions are unconstitutional as a matter of 
law.184 The Court did add, however, that although parents are free to 
become “martyrs,” they cannot make the same decision for their young 
children.185 
Lower courts have employed similar reasoning, with one court stating 
that parents’ freedom to exercise religion was “subject to a reasonable 
regulation for the benefit of society as a whole.”186 Other courts have also 
upheld vaccination laws that did not allow religious exemptions as 
constitutional, reasoning that the lack of a religious exemption does not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause.187 As recently as 2015, another court held 
that mandatory vaccinations as a prerequisite for school attendance were 
constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.188 Because courts have 
ruled both that the presence of a religious exemption is constitutional and 
that the absence of a religious exemption is constitutional, religious 
exemptions are not constitutionally required under the Free Exercise 
Clause.189 The inquiry then turns to the Due Process Clause. 
b. The Due Process Clause Does Not Require Religious Exemptions 
Some courts have rejected arguments that parents’ freedom to educate 
and raise their children under the Due Process Clause includes the decision 
to opt out of vaccinations. One court addressed this argument and held that 
because Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder were related to children’s education and 
not to parents’ refusals to vaccinate their children, the state could force 
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parents to vaccinate their children.190 Other courts have reached similar 
conclusions.191 Notwithstanding one anomalous decision under Smith and 
Yoder that the state must defer to the parents’ wishes regarding how to 
raise their children,192 the most reasonable conclusion is that states are not 
constitutionally required under the Due Process Clause to have religious 
exemptions to their vaccination laws. 
C. Policy Considerations for Philosophical and Religious Exemptions 
Constitutional considerations are not likely to be determinative in state 
decisions to have philosophical or religious exemptions. An analysis of the 
cases from the Supreme Court reveals that the Constitution requires neither 
philosophical nor religious exemptions. Consequently, state decisions 
regarding philosophical and religious exemptions must rely heavily upon 
policy concerns, including the interest in deferring to parental decisions 
balanced against the state’s interest in safeguarding public health. One 
serious policy issue is that philosophical and religious exemptions combined 
have the potential to destroy herd immunity. The discredited193 
philosophical view that vaccinations cause autism has led to decreased 
vaccination rates,194 which threatens herd immunity because it lowers the 
number of vaccinated persons who serve as a barrier against disease 
transmission.195 Additionally, states with lax requirements for proof to 
obtain philosophical exemptions have higher rates of unvaccinated 
children.196 The reason for these increased rates is that states often fail to 
enforce the requirement that the beliefs be sincerely held or exercised in 
good faith,197 which results in the purpose behind the creation of 
philosophical exemptions being unfulfilled. Based on these facts, states 
should not allow philosophical exemptions. 
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As philosophical exemptions can be abused, religious exemptions can 
also be easily exploited. Parents often claim religious exemptions when 
they are unable to obtain medical or philosophical exemptions.198 States 
often grant religious exemptions without substantiating that the belief is 
sincerely held and based upon religion, and they consequently grant 
exemptions to nearly all parents who apply.199 Additionally, groups whose 
objections are not actually based on religion form for the express purpose 
of claiming religious exemptions.200 One report revealed that by mailing a 
letter and making a donation to the “Congregation of Universal Wisdom,” 
founded by chiropractors who believe that Western medicine is pagan and 
satanic, parents can easily obtain a religious exemption.201 
Serious policy considerations, however, are in favor of granting 
religious exemptions. First, religious groups such as the Amish, who do 
possess sincerely held religious beliefs against vaccinations, do not pose a 
public health risk. They are geographically concentrated with a small 
number of adherents202 and primarily expose only themselves to diseases 
preventable by vaccines.203 Because these groups came to the United 
States to practice their religion freely,204 religious exemptions would 
accommodate their right to practice their religion. Consequently, good 
policy favors allowing religious exemptions. 
Second, the lack of a religious exemption interferes with all parents’ 
religious freedom and could lead to decisions that undermine parental 
rights and autonomy. State intrusion in the raising of children can lead to 
dangerous interference because the court, not the parents, would determine 
the best interests of the child. A case exemplifying this danger is Painter 
v. Bannister, wherein the court denied a father custody of his child for no 
reason other than the court’s bias205 in favor of the child’s grandparents.206 
The grandparents were educated and religious, whereas the child’s father 
held no religious beliefs and had liberal political views.207 The problem with 
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allowing courts to use this “best interests of the child” standard is that it 
“necessarily invites the judge to rely on his or her own values and biases to 
decide the case in whatever way the judge thinks best.”208 Legislatures 
mandating vaccinations without religious exemptions is a similar egregious 
intrusion because the legislatures would interfere with parents’ rights to 
raise their children in their chosen religion under the Free Exercise Clause. 
Finally, the Supreme Court recognized in Yoder that the right of parents 
to raise their children in their religion is paramount under the Free Exercise 
Clause.209 Additionally, the dissent in Prince v. Massachusetts stated that 
the right of religious liberty was “too sacred” to be limited without proving 
that the state’s interest was seriously jeopardized.210 Religious groups who 
oppose vaccinations do not pose a serious threat to the public at large.211 
Further, religious exemptions have been granted to parents with a religious 
objection to vaccinations even when the parents’ religion does not formally 
forbid vaccinations.212 Therefore, forcing vaccinations upon their children 
would be a grave intrusion into their religious rights. Consequently, as a 
policy matter, states should allow religious exemptions to their vaccination 
laws. 
IV. A TALE TOLD BY A COMPROMISE: THE CASE FOR BANNING 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXEMPTIONS AND ALLOWING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 
States face a difficult choice in deciding whether to allow both 
religious and philosophical exemptions, whether to ban both, or whether 
to allow only one or the other. On the one hand, private parental decisions 
regarding how to raise children deserve to be honored. On the other hand, 
the public interest in protection from diseases is also at stake. The issue of 
exemptions to state vaccination laws thus presents states with a careful 
balancing act because neither private nor public concerns should be 
allowed to trample the other. 
To solve the problem of exemptions to mandatory vaccination laws, 
states should ban philosophical exemptions and allow religious exemptions. 
California should retain CA SB277’s ban on philosophical exemptions but 
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should alter its law to allow religious exemptions, whereas Louisiana should 
retain its religious exemptions but ban philosophical exemptions.213 
Louisiana and California should ensure that religious exemptions are 
not abused by requiring those who object to vaccinations to present proof 
of their religious beliefs. One study found that requiring a high level of 
proof in the form of notarized signatures reduced the number of 
exemptions,214 and this requirement would help to ensure that the parents 
claiming the exemption do in fact object on religious grounds. The law 
should not attempt to differentiate among religions because such an 
endeavor would lead to Free Exercise problems by burdening the beliefs 
of adherents to nontraditional religions. The standard set forth in Seeger—
that of a “sincere belief, which in his life fills the same place as a belief in 
God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist”215—should be used to avoid 
granting exemptions to groups that claim to be religious but are simply 
trying to avoid vaccinations on philosophical grounds. Louisiana and 
California should adopt language similar to the following: “Exemptions 
will be granted upon the showing of a sincerely held religious belief in the 
form of a notarized letter.” This language would exclude philosophical 
exemptions while avoiding First Amendment problems of favoring one 
religion over another. Furthermore, the notarized letter serves a gate-
keeping function to ensure that those citizens receiving the exemption 
object on religious rather than philosophical grounds. Thus, the risk of 
religious exemptions being abused by those who wish to claim 
philosophical exemptions under the guise of religion would be 
significantly reduced, if not eliminated, because philosophical exemptions 
would not be tolerated in any form. 
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A. Philosophical Exemptions Should Be Banned 
Philosophical exemptions should not be tolerated for two reasons. First, 
parents can claim any reason they wish to receive an exemption. 216 This 
standard is far too broad because it opens the door to illegitimate objections 
that have no basis in science, such as refusing vaccinations because the parents 
dislike the pharmaceutical industry. Second, the increase in unvaccinated 
children because of the mistaken belief that vaccinations cause autism217 must 
be halted to protect the population under herd immunity. 
Several legal reasons in addition to policy considerations218 exist for 
banning philosophical exemptions. First, the Supreme Court has already 
addressed a parent’s worries over adverse effects of vaccines in Jacobson219 
and declared that a minority view could not threaten public health.220 Second, 
claims that parents are conscientious objectors should be rejected because 
parents must comply with the “colliding duty” of the government in 
maintaining high vaccination rates.221 Because states possess the power to 
intervene when parents’ decisions endanger their own children,222 states 
should intervene for the good of other children and the population in general. 
B. Religious Exemptions Should Be Allowed 
States should allow religious exemptions because of policy 
considerations.223 States should follow the language of the Prince 
dissent224 that called the freedom to practice religion a “sacred right” with 
which the government should not interfere. States should also follow the 
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language in Yoder recognizing parents’ rights to raise their children in the 
religion they wish.225 In addition to these abstract considerations, religious 
groups claiming religious exemptions to vaccinations are geographically 
concentrated and small in number;226 therefore, their lack of vaccinations 
is not likely to affect herd immunity. Although religious exemptions would 
lead to a small percentage of the population being unvaccinated, a ban on 
philosophical exemptions would ensure that vaccination rates do not dip 
dangerously low.227 States should recognize religious exemptions even for 
parents who are not part of a small, geographically concentrated religious 
group because their beliefs are also religious in nature and deserve 
recognition. Granting religious exemptions to these parents could threaten 
herd immunity. Because most groups claiming religious exemptions are 
small and geographically concentrated,228 however, this possibility is not 
likely, and courts should not deny parents their religious rights based on this 
remote prospect. Further, if states consider these children or those from a 
small, geographically concentrated religious group who are unvaccinated to 
be serious threats to public health, they have a solution readily available. 
Delaware’s religious exemption states that if an outbreak of a vaccine-
preventable disease occurs, or if in the opinion of the Division of Public 
Health unvaccinated children have had or are at risk of exposure to a vaccine-
preventable disease, those unvaccinated children will be temporarily barred 
from attending public school until the Division of Public Health approves 
otherwise.229 Concerned states should adopt similar provisions. 
Turning to possible legal challenges to the proposed language—
“exemptions will be granted upon the showing of a sincerely held religious 
belief in the form of a notarized letter”—under the Free Exercise Clause, this 
language would survive a challenge of discrimination because it favors 
religions equally. Courts have recognized religious exemptions even when 
the parents’ formal religion does not forbid vaccinations and when the 
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parents hold nontraditional religious beliefs.230 The proposed language 
continues this precedent. Louisiana’s current religious exemption to 
vaccinations would not face such a challenge because its requirement is “a 
written dissent from the student or his parent or guardian.”231 Clearly, the 
language does not discriminate among religions; it should simply be 
modified to disallow philosophical exemptions and to require a notarized 
letter.232 
Addressing possible Establishment Clause challenges to the proposed 
solution, the new language would not violate the Establishment Clause 
under any Supreme Court test. Under one commentator’s argument, this 
language would survive a challenge because it is neutral in its reference to 
religions and because allowing groups to practice their religion as they 
wish justifies the burden of slightly lowered vaccination rates.233 Religious 
groups who opt out of vaccinations pose risks to themselves,234 and 
banning philosophical exemptions would ensure that overall vaccination 
rates remain high. Under the Agostini test,235 the proposed solution does 
not indoctrinate its citizens; it poses no problem of identifying the 
recipients by a named religion; and the exemption does not create 
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excessive governmental entanglement. Finally, under the Cutter test,236 the 
solution would not burden nonreligious citizens because religious groups 
threaten only themselves by refusing to vaccinate their children.237 No 
possibility of sectarian discrimination exists, and the exemption would not 
trump the other significant concern of maintaining herd immunity because 
religious groups are small in number and geographically concentrated.238 
States should grant religious exemptions even to parents who are not part of 
a small, geographically concentrated religious group because their beliefs 
are equally worthy of recognition. States concerned with the implications 
for herd immunity as a result of granting these exemptions can adopt a 
provision similar to Delaware’s limiting unvaccinated children from 
attending school temporarily during a disease outbreak or if these children 
are at risk of exposure to the disease.239 Finally, eliminating philosophical 
exemptions while simultaneously tightening the requirements for religious 
exemptions would ensure that overall vaccination rates remain high. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the importance of maintaining high vaccination rates, states 
have the police power to enact their own vaccination laws.240 Allowing both 
philosophical and religious exemptions can create the risk of disease 
outbreaks, which in turn can affect the rest of the population.241 States that 
are lax in enforcing requirements for philosophical and religious exemptions 
have the highest number of unvaccinated children.242 As CA SB277 
demonstrates, however, banning religious exemptions infringes upon the 
religious rights of groups who oppose vaccinations on religious grounds.243 
Parents who object on philosophical grounds, such as the discredited link 
between autism and vaccinations,244 pose the highest threat by raising the 
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number of unvaccinated children unchecked.245 Religious groups by 
themselves do not pose a threat to herd immunity,246 and even those 
parents who object on religious grounds but are not part of a 
geographically concentrated group deserve recognition under religious 
exemptions. Consequently, states should ban philosophical exemptions 
and allow religious exemptions. 
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